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Section 1:
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1 INTRODUCTION
Labour intermediaries or labour recruiters are individuals 
or organisations that connect a person seeking 
employment to the employer. They refer to both private 
and public entities that offer labour recruitment services 
(Andrees, Nasri and Swiniarski 2015). The former are 
independent of public authorities, and can be formal 
such as registered employment agencies or informal 
such as illegal sub-agents and brokers. Informal labour 
intermediaries (ILIs) are generally unregistered and may 
comprise small enterprises or individual brokers who 
recruit workers in remote areas that the larger private 
recruitment agencies (PRAs) cannot reach. PRAs are 
generally located in big cities and thus rely heavily on 
these sub-agents and brokers to obtain clients and 
sustain their businesses. There is a wide spectrum of 
ILIs, ranging from criminal networks and traffickers to 
semi-legal private agencies or individual middlemen 
(Chakrabarty and Grote 2009). 
In Nepal, there are approximately 1,000 licensed PRAs, 
mostly based in the capital city of Kathmandu, and 
30,000 unregistered brokers acting as intermediaries 
between potential workers and employment agencies 
(Baumann and Dharel 2014). In Bangladesh, there are 
almost 900 recruitment agencies in operation, along 
with a large number of sub-agents and intermediaries 
across the country (ILO 2014). In Myanmar, while the 
number of unregistered brokers is difficult to determine, 
259 employment agencies are licensed by the country’s 
Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population (ILO 
2018). Most of these PRAs send migrant workers 
to foreign countries and perform various tasks and 
transactions related to the migration process. While 
not all PRAs – including sub-agents and brokers – 
are fraudulent, many forms of abuse, deception, and 
exploitation have been extensively documented. Common 
violations include employment contract substitution, ‘false 
promises’ of high salary, exorbitant recruitment fees, 
and confiscation of identity documents (IOM 2015). In 
extreme cases, aspiring workers – including children – 
become trapped in forced labour, as they are trafficked 
into different sectors such as domestic work, the fishing 
industry, and commercial sexual exploitation (CSE).
In the context of child labour, the type and role of labour 
intermediaries vary according to the job sector or industry 
in which the child is exploited, or whether international 
vs internal migration occurs. Common types of the worst 
forms of child labour (WFCL) in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Myanmar occur in the agricultural sector, brick kilns, 
the seafood industry, garment factories, domestic work, 
CSE, army recruitment, and many other sectors. Each of 
these sectors has its own dynamics of recruitment, with 
some degree of overlap. For example, involvement of 
children in brick kilns in Nepal usually happens through 
recruitment of the head of the family when a loan is taken 
from a contractor (Lieten et al. 2010), while recruitment 
into child domestic work (CDW) in Myanmar is sometimes 
facilitated by teachers and monks (ILO 2019d). 
International border-crossing involving children is often 
mediated by traffickers (under different guises) when the 
migration is irregular, and PRAs when legal channels 
are attempted. In this review, discussion on child labour 
in the context of international migration is limited by the 
relatively small amount of evidence found.
One common notion in the narratives of child labour and 
exploitation is the perpetrator being a stranger to the 
child, forcing him or her into labour through trafficking 
or abduction against the family’s knowledge and will. 
However, growing evidence shows a different picture. 
Worldwide, the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative 
(CTDC) reported family complicity in almost half of child-
trafficking cases (United Nations 2017). In Nepal, entry of 
minors into the adult entertainment sector (AES) is said 
to be largely facilitated by friends and relatives rather 
than the more formal ‘labour intermediaries’ or ‘brokers’ 
(Oosterhoff and Hacker 2020). It has also been reported 
that many CSE cases among young girls occur through 
jobs made possible with the help of someone close 
to them such as a female relative or sibling with prior 
experience in the sex industry (GMACL 2014). Similarly, 
child domestic workers (CDWs) in Bangladesh are said 
to be given away by parents to employers – facilitated by 
relatives or neighbours – at times for economic reasons 
or in the hope of protecting and giving the child access 
to education (Chodhuary, Islam and Akter 2013). In other 
instances, children migrate from the village to the city to 
find work – with friends or peers as intermediaries – but 
end up in hazardous and exploitative working conditions. 
Despite the various legislations and initiatives such 
as mandatory registration and licensing, regulating 
the recruitment industry has been difficult due to the 
continued presence of ILIs. ILIs are not easy to detect 
given their operation outside the legal framework, 
without any legal identity or fixed premises. The heavy 
dependence of formal PRAs on ILIs is another factor; it is 
much easier, faster, and cheaper for recruitment agencies 
to obtain clients through ILIs than having to manage 
offices in remote areas. By using ILIs, recruitment 
agencies can also easily escape regulatory oversight 
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and avoid taking responsibility for any complaints or 
occurrences of fraud during the recruitment process 
(IOM 2015). In the context of child labour, the highly 
informal setting and relationships involved – along with 
socio-cultural norms that permit it – have rendered the 
identification of intermediaries and intervention efforts 
even more problematic. 
This review aims to gather and review existing evidence 
on ILIs in the context of WFCL in Nepal, Myanmar, and 
Bangladesh. Findings are meant to support the Child 
Labour: Action Research in South and South Eastern Asia 
(CLARISSA) research programme led by the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), and inform policymaking. 
Specific objectives of this review are to:
• Identify ILIs, describe their characteristics, and 
understand how they work;
• Study the outcomes of ILI-mediated labour or 
migration;
• Identify existing interventions that target labour 
intermediaries – formal and informal – linked to 
WFCL; and
• Study the outcomes of these interventions.
The report is structured as follows. Following this 
introduction, Section 2 outlines the methodology used. 
Section 3 examines the background and driving factors 
of ILIs and their types, characteristics, and modes of 
operating in each of the three countries. It then looks at 
the outcomes of ILI-mediated labour or migration and 
the interventions that address formal and informal labour 
intermediaries. A discussion follows in Section 4 and the 
report concludes by outlining the report’s limitations.
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2 METHODOLOGY
The political economy framework with sector-level 
analyses was adopted in this review (DFID 2009). To 
understand the role of ILIs in the context of WFCL, a 
broad overview of political and economic processes 
in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar was initially 
obtained. This was followed by attempts to unpack power 
imbalances, interests, and incentives of different groups 
(e.g. child workers vs employers, or child vs recruiter), 
roles of formal and informal institutions (e.g. PRAs vs 
informal brokers), and impacts of values and ideas (ibid.) 
(e.g. social norms that enable child labour or discriminate 
against girls) – all of which provide clues to the research 
questions. Sector-level analyses categorised findings 
according to country and job sector/industry; for example, 
CDW, brick kilns, garment factories, etc. Based on each 
sector/industry, ILIs were identified and characterised.
This review gathered evidence from within the last ten 
years (January 2010 to March 2020) through a desk-
based search that comprised mainly three tracks: 
academic literature search, snowballing, and capture 
of grey literature. Search in academic databases was 
performed using a set of terms in title/abstract/keywords. 
The complete list of search terms and their combinations 
can be seen in Annexe B. 
Snowballing involved scanning through the list of 
references of selected publications to identify potential 
papers. Relevant works previously known to the author 
were also gathered and a backward citation was 
performed on their bibliographies. Similarly, the references 
of all identified systematic reviews were screened. 
Capture of grey literature included a thorough search of 
databases and websites to look for publications other 
than peer-reviewed journal articles, such as policy 
documents, donor and government reports, proposals, 
evaluations, and many more. While searching for grey 
literature, a more flexible approach was adopted; search 
terms mentioned were not followed strictly, rather they 
were modified or combined differently according to what 
the database/website search function permitted. 
Selection criteria included: (a) studies/reports/webpages 
that mentioned any form of intervention or programme 
targeting labour intermediaries or the recruitment industry in 
Nepal, Bangladesh, or Myanmar; (b) studies that described 
why (causes and risk factors) and how (processes and 
pathways) WFCL occurs; (c) evaluation reports on 
programmes related to child labour or the recruitment 
industry; (d) studies or reports that discussed issues related 
to labour rights, codes of conduct, or recruitment guidelines 
within the context of Southeast Asia or South Asia; and 
(e) studies that addressed CSE within Nepal, Bangladesh, 
or Myanmar from any perspective. The following were 
excluded: studies with only abstracts available, conference 
proceedings, reviews on WFCL without specification of 
a country or location, and reviews or articles on labour 
intermediaries that did not specify a country or location. 
Sources of academic and grey literature were:
• Academic databases: Web of Science, Scopus, 
CINAHL, Social Policy and Practice; 
• Online research libraries: 3ie Impact Evaluation 
Repository, BRIDGE Global Resources, ELDIS; 
• UN/banks/government agency websites: 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
publications/external evaluations, International 
Labour Organization (ILO) publications/project 
evaluations, Department for International 
Development (DFID) Research for Development 
Outputs, UNICEF Data and Evaluation Database, 
and United States Department of Labor (USDOL); 
• Donor/non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
websites: The Freedom Fund (monitoring and 
evaluation), Walk Free Foundation Resources, Free 
the Slaves (monitoring and evaluation), Save the 
Children (research and reports), Terre des hommes 
(publications), Global March Against Child Labour 
(research and publications), Bangladesh Shishu 
Adhikar Forum (BSAF), and Aparajeyo; 
• Systematic review databases: 3ie, Cochrane 
(CDRS), Campbell, EPPI Centre; and 
• Google and Google Scholar.
Publications/studies/reports included were restricted to 
the context of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, and 
those written in English. Types of WFCL covered in this 
review are the brick kilns industry; the seafood industry; 
the carpet, leather, and garment sector; portering; child 
domestic work (CDW); and child trafficking mainly for CSE. 
The topic of child soldiers or recruitment of children for 
use in armed conflicts is beyond the scope of this report. 
Definition of key terminologies and concepts such as 
the worst forms of child labour (WFCL), labour recruiter, 
private recruitment agency (PRA) and others are available 
in Annexe A. In this review, the definition of an intermediary 
is broad: it encompasses any individual, group, or entity 
– whether or not they are considered a labour recruiter or 
view themselves as such – that offers, assists, facilitates, 
or mediates employment for a potential (child) worker.
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3 FINDINGS
3.1 Background and driving factors 
of ILIs
The continued presence of ILIs who facilitate child labour 
is attributed to a number of factors. Other than poverty, 
these include elements that push children into labour and 
pressure from the demand side. Despite the diversity in 
economic and socio-cultural circumstances across the 
three countries under study, some similarities are evident. 
They include: poverty and lack of social protection among 
the poor; limited access to formal education; widespread 
existence of informal, unregulated industries and job 
sectors; employers’ preferences for youths or children; 
dependency of formal PRAs on ILIs; familiarity of rural 
families with ILIs; and social acceptance. To a great 
extent, these factors have enabled the continued presence 
of ILIs and made them an inherent part of society. 
For instance, in Bangladesh’s seafood industry, informal 
recruitment may have thrived for several reasons. Due to 
its high concentration in specific localities and availability 
of job opportunities, many parents persuade their 
children to engage in work as a way of increasing family 
income. This practice is reinforced by the high rates of 
school dropouts, and employers’ preferences for children 
because they are a source of cheap labour and said to be 
more obedient and less likely to organise themselves to 
demand for rights (Ferdousi and Faruk 2016). In addition, 
the highly informal setting and nature of the industry and 
surrounding entities make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to formalise recruitment practices. Similarly, the huge 
presence of garment factories in Bangladesh – many 
unregistered – has created a lot of demand for female 
workers, to which ILIs bring young girls from villages for 
work. Most of these ILIs are known to the children or 
their families – they are often friends, existing workers, 
relatives, or neighbours – and out of trust, parents are not 
hesitant about letting their children go. 
Another example of how ILIs emerge and remain relevant 
can be seen in the need for child protection in times 
of political crisis – a commonality between Nepal and 
Myanmar – and natural disasters, a common problem in 
Nepal and Bangladesh. The armed conflicts in Myanmar 
which mostly affected ethnic minorities were said to have 
forced many poor families to send away their children to 
the cities and place them either in Burmese households 
to work as CDWs or in the monasteries where they are 
managed by monks. Monks have been reported to act 
as ILIs supplying CDWs to urban families who, in turn, 
prefer children as they are seen as being more honest, 
obedient, and easy to handle compared to adult workers 
(ILO 2019d). Likewise, evidence shows that both the 
civil war between Maoists and the Nepalese government 
and the 2015 earthquake in Nepal had compelled some 
families to give away their children to middlemen who 
took them to cities for work, and caused the resurgence of 
traffickers who posed as aid workers or labour recruiters 
(Dharel, Rai and Thapa 2015; Free the Slaves 2015).
The effect of social norms on ILI roles can be seen in the 
involvement of children in brick kilns in Nepal as a result 
of parents taking loans from brokers or employers. A 
comparable situation exists in the Kamlari system where 
families accept advance payments from middlemen in 
exchange for their child’s service (Basnet 2016). These 
traditions or practices enabled ILIs to continue operating – 
while taking advantage of the poor’s trust and vulnerability 
– in order to gain profit. In CSE, the dynamics of social 
norms also play a crucial role in allowing ILIs to thrive 
and easily ‘recruit’ young girls into sex work. For instance, 
occurrences of daughters being sold by parents to 
traffickers, or young girls being given away by family 
members in exchange for money for sex work have 
been documented. Such practices are condoned by the 
existing culture of patriarchy and gender discrimination 
(ECPAT 2014). 
3.2 ILI types, characteristics, and 
modes of operating 
While formal labour intermediaries generally refer to 
registered public and private entities that offer labour 
recruitment services (Andrees et al. 2015), ILIs are 
difficult to define. The term ‘recruiter’ used in many 
studies to describe labour intermediaries – including 
informal ones – assumes and formalises a relationship 
that does not always reflect actual practice (Heissler 
2013). Typically, ILIs were reported as unregistered 
sub-agents, sub-contractors, brokers, or middlemen, 
but in reality a wide range of entities played the role of 
intermediaries. These include traffickers, community 
members (teachers, friends, neighbours, and religious 
figures) and family members (parents, siblings, and 
relatives). In many circumstances, the main sources of 
child recruitment are individuals close to or known to the 
children (ibid.). Similarly, many children who migrate to 
cities for labour travel with family members or persons 
from the same village rather than traffickers or strangers 
(Tamang and Frederick 2006). Numerous terms have 
been used to describe the person(s) who assumed the 
role of intermediary or facilitated work for children. They 
varied according to the socio-cultural contexts, and some 
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were interchangeable while others were not. Examples 
were ‘contacts’, ‘brokers’, ‘dalal’, ‘middleman’, ‘agents’, 
‘friend’, ‘kin’, ‘fictive kin’, ‘apon’, ‘naike’, ‘relative’, ‘kala’ 
and many more. 
3.2.1 Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, ILIs are generally known as sub-agents 
or by the local term ‘dalal’. These are individuals who 
operate at the village level and recruit potential workers, 
often for international migration. Sub-agents – often 
without any legal identity – are usually the first point of 
contact whose main functions are to provide information 
and perform all necessary transactions on the worker’s 
behalf. Many of these sub-agents are returnee migrants, 
who have become familiar with migration procedures. 
Some sub-agents perform a single task such as 
processing a client’s passport, while others perform 
multiple tasks for them. These may include all the 
required steps and processes prior to migration. While the 
terms ‘sub-agent’ and ‘dalal’ are interchangeable, in some 
studies distinctions are made between the two. Dalals are 
described as the first point of contact for recruitment, or in 
other words the front-line person who actually recruits a 
potential worker from the village. Sub-agents, on the other 
hand, refer to the next tier of recruitment who connects 
dalals to the employment agencies in the city. Often, 
sub-agents originate from the same village but are based 
in a town or city (Abrar et al. 2017).
The relationship between potential workers and dalals 
is often very informal, as the dalal can be the worker’s 
relative or friend, or a village member. Dalals are usually 
individuals well respected in the community and while 
acting as a broker they may: (a) act as referees for 
moneylenders so that the aspiring worker can obtain 
a loan to finance his migration; (b) become a conduit 
for information about the wellbeing of the worker upon 
departure; and (c) sometimes even advise a potential 
migrant on which job and visa to apply for (Abrar et al. 
2017; Rahman 2011; Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh 2012). 
In other instances, dalals themselves offer loans, thus 
assuming the role of moneylender. Employment agencies 
which are mostly located in cities rely heavily on sub-
agents and/or dalals to obtain clients, the majority of 
whom live in remote villages. Similarly, many people in 
rural areas turn to these dalals for finding jobs because 
they live closer, are easier to approach, are known to 
them, and often provide practical, step-by-step guidance 
for the worker (MFA 2019a). The role of sub-agents/
dalals is especially important for those seeking to migrate 
overseas. 
The seafood industry
Child labour is prevalent in the seafood industry in 
Bangladesh. Studies showed that involvement of children 
in the dry fish industry occurred in several ways: (a) they 
became entrapped because their parents had taken 
an advance payment (cash/loan) from the employer, in 
exchange for their child’s labour; (b) parents might have 
debts or other contracts with the employer; (c) children 
were deceived by false promises about the nature of the 
work and the salary – often made by recruiters – before 
landing in this sector; and (d) children got involved 
through the employer’s pressure on parents (BBS 2011).
An interview conducted among child labourers in the dry 
fish industry revealed that more than half (56 per cent) 
were recruited by friends, relatives, or other workers. This 
was followed by self-contact with employers (24.2 per 
cent), employers approaching parents (12.6 per cent), 
and middlemen or recruiters (7.2 per cent) (BBS 2011). 
Another study among 100 child labourers in the seafood 
(fish and shrimp) industry showed that approximately half 
(48 per cent) were involved through their parents, 32 per 
cent through friends and relatives, 12 per cent through 
brokers, and 7 per cent through self-contact. However, 
little information was provided about the brokers (Ferdousi 
and Faruk 2016).
Child domestic work 
CDW is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh. More 
than 150,000 CDWs were estimated to be in Dhaka 
alone, employed in 9 per cent of mostly middle-class 
households (Lieten et al. 2010). Children as young as six 
years old work as CDWs – cooking, cleaning, washing, 
and caring for their employer’s young children or old 
parents/relatives. Not all CDWs are paid or compensated 
with money. Some are only given shelter and food – 
necessities considered ‘good enough’ compared to their 
harsh rural lives. CDWs often work long hours with little 
or no rest, are kept isolated (i.e. not allowed to leave the 
house), are forbidden from contacting their parents or 
family members, and are highly vulnerable to physical, 
verbal, and sexual abuse. 
Different people play the role of intermediary in CDW. 
They include: 
• Formal employment agencies. It was reported 
that these agencies advertised their services in 
newspapers and residential areas; but their roles 
were minimal and most employers preferred hiring 
CDWs through known contacts. 
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• Parents or mothers. Mothers working as domestic 
helpers often brought their children with them, 
who eventually ended up being employed as 
CDWs (Chodhuary et al. 2013; Pelto 1997). This 
usually occurred in poor families who migrated 
to urban areas due to poverty, family breakdown, 
or natural disasters (Zohir 2001; Farhana, Marchi 
and Rahman 2010). Sometimes, parents who lived 
in the urban slum of Dhaka city actively sought 
to send their children away for domestic work in 
order to cope with poverty (Chodhuary et al. 2013). 
• Relatives or neighbours. This group plays a huge 
role in getting children involved in CDW. A study by 
Bangladesh Shishu Adhikar Forum (BSAF) found 
that 57 per cent of CDWs found work through 
relatives (BSAF 2015). Similarly, major sources 
used by employers to find CDWs were relatives 
followed by neighbours (BSAF 2016). The term 
‘relative’, however, has multiple meanings and 
does not necessarily indicate someone with blood 
relations. ‘Relative’ could mean kin or fictive kin, 
or simply someone close. For instance, ‘apon’ was 
used to describe kin or fictive kin, i.e. a figure that 
is known and trusted who makes a child worker 
feel ‘safe’ and confident to move to the city for 
work. In other instances, older children reported 
that they approached older female relatives called 
‘kala’ for help in finding work. For most people 
in rural areas, kinship networks were preferred 
over associations based on other affiliations 
(Heissler 2013).
• Community members, arbitrators, or middlemen. 
Members of the community who were influential 
and trusted could act as intermediaries. For 
example, a union Parishad (council) member 
could act as a middleman between the child and 
employer to facilitate domestic work (Heissler 
2013). The term ‘arbitrator’ described a recruiting 
middleman who was neither family of the employer 
nor the child, but usually recruited CDWs from 
his immediate network. An arbitrator was often 
an influential and respected figure in a locality/
village who could easily gain parents’ trust. The 
honourable position could be attributed to land 
ownership or having a position in a political or 
educational institution. This arbitrator thus could 
be a politician, schoolteacher, or an NGO worker. 
Also called middlemen, at times they deceived 
parents by fabricating pleasant stories about the 
child’s potential employer and life as a CDW in the 
city (Lieten et al. 2010).
• Others – siblings or other CDWs. There were 
reports of employers in the cities who found 
CDWs from the village through another CDW who 
happened to be the child’s friend (BSAF 2016).
Not all parents who agreed to send their children away to 
be engaged as CDWs did so out of desperation (poverty). 
While this was the case with many families (as CDWs 
contribute to the family’s income), the underlying reasons 
for children’s involvement in domestic work could be 
more complex. For instance, some employers actively 
sought CDWs from their own home town (village) and 
approached poor families known to them. The child’s 
parents were usually in a weak bargaining position 
when they agreed. While negotiating, employers may 
give promises to arrange for the child’s marriage in the 
future or offer help to the family in times of crisis. In other 
situations, the employers may have extended help to the 
family in the past (e.g. a loan or medical treatment), so 
the parents felt obliged to agree. 
On the other hand, some parents readily agreed to 
give their children away with the intention of forging 
a relationship with a rich, influential household. This 
relationship was deemed important to assist the poor 
family in times of difficulty. Another reason for sending 
children away for domestic work was the assumption 
(sometimes due to promises made by employers) that 
the rich household would provide the child with good 
care and the opportunity for education, in exchange for 
household chores. 
Other industries – garment, leather, etc.
Involvement of children in other sectors such as the 
garment and leather industries often occurred through 
pathways similar to some of those described for CDWs. 
Children either actively searched for, or were offered jobs 
by contacts who usually consisted of individuals known 
to them: relatives, kin or fictive kin, siblings, friends, or 
influential/trusted community members (Heissler 2013). 
Some were able to secure the job they wanted, while 
others were deceived and ended up with a job they did 
not want. The garment sector is dominated by female 
workers, and many of the girls were said to have either 
approached the employer directly (usually the case with 
older and more experienced girls) or obtained the job 
through a friend or sibling already working there.
3.2.2 Nepal
ILIs in Nepal who recruit potential migrant workers for 
working overseas are somewhat similar to those in 
Bangladesh. Termed ‘local agents’, they connect people 
in the village to employment agencies (often referred 
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to as ‘manpower agencies’) in the city. As described 
earlier, local agents are often individuals who are known 
to villagers and have informal relationships with them 
(family, relative, or friend, etc.) (MFA 2019b).
Brick kiln industry
In 2016, total of 1,100 brick kilns were estimated to be 
operating in Nepal, producing approximately 15,000 
to 50,000 bricks a day to fulfil the high demand for 
construction. The brick industry is seasonal, often 
operating during the winter for six months (HERD 2016). 
Brick-making is a highly labour-intensive process and 
despite the poor working conditions, the industry provides 
jobs to thousands of unskilled labourers. It has been 
estimated that 200,000 workers – including 32,000 
children – work in brick kilns (GFI n.d.). Due to its highly 
informal nature and little government oversight, the brick 
kiln industry is deeply implicated with exploitative labour 
practices such as bonded and child labour.
Even though some children have been reported to work 
in brick kilns out of choice (to earn income), the vast 
majority were entrapped in the industry by following their 
parents – many of whom were bonded labourers – and 
thus were expected to contribute. Families were usually 
recruited by a ‘contractor’, or ‘naike’, in the village who 
provided cash in advance, forcing them into debt bondage 
(Larmar et al. 2017; Musa and Olsen 2018). These naikes 
visit households in the village and act as middlemen 
between families (workers) and kiln owners (Lieten et al. 
2010). The tradition of handing out cash in advance – 
known as peshgi – was learned from Indian contractors. 
Poor families often felt compelled to accept peshgi as it 
was needed either to survive during the monsoon months 
when work was scarce and subsistence was hardest 
(Hoffmann 2017), or for celebrations and paying off loans 
during the festival season (Lieten et al. 2010). 
The head of the family who accepted these advance 
payments would then ‘take his own children or make 
arrangements with other families or neighbours to take 
other children from their village in order to fulfil their work 
obligations, repay the advances and earn some extra 
money’ (Lieten et al. 2010: 22). Children were thus not 
directly recruited by naikes, but taken along by adult 
members of the family. 
1 The Kamaiya system is a traditional practice in which labourers work under the contract with their landlords in order to clear their 
debt. In July 2000, the Kamaiya Movement brought revolution for the Kamaiya by forcing the government of Nepal to abolish the 
Kamaiya system through the Kamaiya Labor (Prohibition) Act, 2002 (https://caveeta.wordpress.com/2011/11/14/the-movements-
of-kamaiya/).
Child domestic work
In the Kamlari system, ex-bonded labourers would trade 
their daughters to the landowner in exchange for a 
right to own a piece of land or to pay off previous debts 
(Fauconnier 2019). As a result, girls – many as young as 
six years old – lived in servitude and worked as domestic 
servants in higher-caste or urban middle-class households, 
usually for a period of one year or sometimes until the 
employer decided to set them free. Despite being officially 
banned in 2006, practices similar to Kamlari still exist (ibid.). 
The recruiters (termed ‘middlemen’ in some studies) 
travelled to rural areas during the annual Maghi festival 
in January in search of children (girls) for their clients. 
Recruiters were said to arrive on motorbikes and roam 
the area, looking for potential kamlaris. They often tried to 
convince the girl’s parents by promising free education for 
her in a reputable school or by offering cash to the male 
head of the household. Upon agreement, children would be 
pledged as CDWs for the following year (Hoffmann 2017; 
CWA 2007). This system has been increasingly used by 
freed Kamaiyas1 who lived in dire poverty.
In the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake, there were 
reports of traffickers (sometimes posing as aid workers or 
labour recruiters) who made offers of relief support (food 
and essentials), training, job opportunities, education, 
loans, and even marriage to foreigners. Victims – usually 
children and youths from isolated areas – ended up 
being trafficked to multiple destinations which included 
Kathmandu and other cities in Nepal, India, and Gulf 
countries where they were forced to work in different 
sectors and industries, including as CDWs (Dharel et al. 
2015; Free the Slaves 2015). 
The practice of ‘sheltering’ was another phenomenon 
that led to CDW in Nepal, mainly as a result of the armed 
conflict between Maoists and government forces. Families 
in remote areas were reported to hand over their children 
to strangers in urban areas to avoid being recruited by 
Maoists. These children were employed as CDWs in 
exchange for food and accommodation. However, this was 
not always the case. In fact, the majority of children who 
migrated to the city for jobs received assistance from, and 
travelled with, family members or persons from the same 
village (Tamang and Frederick 2006). Other intermediaries 
were relatives and trusted individuals who usually came 
from the same village or home town (Dharel et al. 2015).
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Other sectors – the carpet industry, portering, 
restaurants/tea stalls, etc.
Child labour in the carpet industry occurs when parents 
receive advance payments from a recruiter (known as 
a ‘thekedar’), which put the family in debt bondage and 
results in the child being taken away to work in a carpet 
factory, sometimes against his or her will. Children could 
also be entrapped in bonded labour (in carpet factories) 
by inheriting their parents’ or other family members’ debt, 
or by being individually pledged (CWA 2007).
On the other hand, most child porters were said to 
find work through relatives and friends who were older 
and had previous experience of working in markets. 
Getting a job as a porter was relatively easy and not 
impossible without contacts (Lieten et al. 2010; de Groot 
2010). Those who worked in restaurants or tea stalls 
sometimes came to the city with older siblings, peers, 
or known adults, whereas some others were recruited 
directly by employers from the same village who made 
arrangements with the child’s parents (Lieten et al. 2010). 
Children could also end up working in any of these 
sectors/industries through deception by traffickers as 
described earlier (Dharel et al. 2015). 
3.2.3 Myanmar 
Little is known about labour brokerage and ILIs in 
Myanmar in comparison to Bangladesh and Nepal. 
However, existing evidence indicates that ILIs operating 
in Myanmar – usually known as ‘agents’ – mostly facilitate 
migration to Thailand for jobs in different sectors (e.g. the 
fishing industry, manufacturing, etc.). Other common 
foreign destinations for Burmese migrant workers are 
Malaysia, Singapore, and China. These agents can 
work as individuals or in small groups; they are usually 
well connected to other local agents, foreign (Thai) 
agents, or government officers in Thailand (Sakaew and 
Tangpratchakoon 2009). Many of them are former migrant 
workers who have become familiar with the system and 
have established connections with Thai officers, and they 
are known to the workers and their families as they often 
recruit people from the same village. Indeed, some agents 
have been reported to be either relatives or neighbours 
(ibid.). Most Burmese families and youths, however, 
migrate internally in their search for jobs and safety, and 
are more frequently facilitated by friends, relatives, and 
acquaintances than commercial brokers (Oh 2019).
Child domestic work
CDW is prevalent in Myanmar and driven by multiple 
factors such as poverty, armed conflict, social 
acceptance, and lack of educational and job opportunities 
for children and youths. Many CDWs come from poor 
families of ethnic minority origin, and they are sent away 
by their parents as a way of ‘saving’ them from hardship 
and danger. The practice of adoption by childless 
employers and teachers, and the demand for obedient 
and cheap labour are other reasons why CDW thrives in 
the country (ILO 2019d).
The pathway through which children become CDWs 
involves a number of intermediaries. Other than 
‘brokers’, family members and friends play a role. A direct 
relationship could exist between the employer and the 
child’s family. Originating from the same village and 
having known each other, arrangements were sometimes 
made and the child would be taken to the city by a relative 
to work as a CDW. 
Brokers, on the other hand, could be lay people, but 
many of them were respected or influential figures in 
the community such as religious leaders (e.g. monks) 
and teachers. Monks were reported to bring children 
from areas affected by poverty and conflict to Yangon 
as some parents preferred to send their children to the 
city for safety, and asked that they be placed in ‘foster’ 
households (ILO 2019d). In other cases, parents wanted 
their children – particularly boys – to be taken to monastic 
schools where they could receive education. Given 
the high status enjoyed by monks, parents generally 
trusted them to keep their children safe, while employers 
approached these monks with requests for ‘good’ children 
to employ. Children were thus released to employers 
– often in good faith but without the permission or 
knowledge of their parents – to work as CDWs. Likewise, 
Christian congregations, centres, and orphanages were 
said to have facilitated CDWs by liaising between poor, 
rural families and potential employers. However, evidence 
pertaining to their role in recruitment was limited, 
warranting further research (ibid.). 
When mediated by brokers, parents are often given a 
three-month advance of their children’s salary – from 
which brokers draw their commission – as a ‘guarantee’, 
to prevent the child from quitting or running away. This 
practice puts great pressure on CDWs to remain in their 
job, as violation of their employment would compel the 
parents to pay twice the amount of the child’s salary. 
On the other hand, some children and youths through 
the influence of peers and social media actively sought 
work and became CDWs. They were usually assisted by 
friends who linked them to brokers. The Kyimyindaing 
train station in Yangon was reported as an infamous spot 
where brokers often gathered to receive CDWs off the 
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Country Job 
sector
Intermediary Characteristics/modes of operating
Bangladesh General 
(usually for 
international 
migration)
Sub-agent/dalal* The most common type of broker approached by people in rural areas 
who aspire to migrate overseas to work. Many sub-agents are returnee 
migrants who live in the same village/locality and have links with PRAs 
in the city. They are known to villagers and can be relatives, friends, 
or influential figures. They offer information and provide step-by-step 
guidance on the migration process. They have no legal identity or fixed 
premise/office and are sometimes reachable only via mobile phone. 
They may act as a moneylender and offer loans to aspiring migrant 
workers, usually with high interest. They often charge high recruitment 
fees and will perform various tasks such as passport and visa 
processing, document preparation, transport arrangements, etc.
Seafood 
industry
Parents • Parents have taken a loan/advance payment from the employer in 
exchange for their child’s labour; or 
• parents have debts or other forms of contracts with the employer, 
necessitating the child to work; or 
• the child gets involved through the pressure put on his/her parents by 
the employer.
Friends, relatives, other 
workers
Recruit or assist children who are seeking jobs. They may or may not 
receive incentives for recruitment.
Middleman/broker Recruits adults/children seeking jobs, sometimes through deception and 
false promises about the nature of the work and the wages. Receives 
remuneration for recruitment.
CSE Trafficker Can appear as a broker or recruiter who offers a job with good salary 
(false promises). In many instances, they are known to the child/victim 
and can be relatives, friends, or neighbours. Sometimes, they are 
female siblings or family members who are already working in the sex 
industry. Others are strangers, operating in small (criminal) groups.
Parents/husband/in-laws Sell child to the trafficker.
Others (law enforcers, 
border security officials, 
moneylenders, villagers, 
etc.
Collaborate with traffickers, or facilitate trafficking activities through 
receiving bribes. 
CDW Employment agencies Advertise services in newspapers or residential areas. Their role is 
minimal.
Parents • Mother works as domestic help and takes her child to work. The child 
ends up as a CDW.
• Parents send away their child to the employer through negotiations. 
In such a case, usually the two families have known each other and 
come from the same village.
• Parents send away their child through a middleman – usually a relative 
– who approaches them on behalf of employer.
Relatives/neighbours • Relatives – assist parents searching for a household for their child, 
either to work as a CDW (for economic reasons) or as a ‘foster family’ 
in the city.
• Relatives/neighbours – link employer in the city to a rural family known 
to them.
• Relatives include cousins, distant family members, kin or fictive kin, or 
someone close and trusted. Other terms for ‘relative’: apon, kala.
• Older children sometimes approach relatives directly to get help in 
finding jobs.
Community members/
arbitrators
Usually someone respected, trusted and influential in the village/
community such as a teacher, politician, council member, NGO worker, 
etc. They may not necessarily be related to the child/family. Parents 
trust them to mediate between the child and employer.
Other CDWs Assist employers in the city to obtain CDWs by getting/recruiting their 
own friends.
Garment, 
leather, etc.
Friends/siblings Girls/young women who are already in the garment sector often 
facilitate recruitment for their friends and siblings.
Others Other intermediaries are somewhat similar to those described in CDW.
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Intermediary Characteristics/modes of operating
Nepal Brick kiln Contractor/naike Visits houses in the village and offers advances/cash (peshgi) to poor 
families in need. Families who accept peshgi debt bondage have to 
work in brick kilns to repay the advances and earn money. Children are 
brought along with the family to work/contribute. 
CDW Recruiter/middleman Travels to rural areas during the annual Maghi festival in January in 
search of children (girls) for their clients. Lures parents by promising 
free education for the child in a reputable school or by offering cash to 
the male head of the household. Upon agreement, children would be 
pledged as CDWs for the following year.
Trafficker Poses as an aid worker or recruiter and offers food, job opportunities, 
training, education, etc. Traffics victims into various sectors, including 
CDW.
Stranger Under the practice called ‘sheltering’, rural families send away their 
children to strangers to avoid them being recruited by Maoists. The child 
works in a household in exchange for food and shelter. 
Family members/relatives/
friends
Facilitate different kinds of jobs for the child, including CDW.
CSE Trafficker Works in small groups, often in collaboration with employers 
(e.g. brothel owners), local officials, and border officials. Some work 
independently by selling victims to brothel owners, while some are 
employed by brothel owners to ‘recruit labour’. Some are known to the 
victims by living in the same village or through friends/relatives.
Spouse/parents • Some husbands/parents sell their wives/daughters to traffickers.
• When parents are indebted to an employer/recruiter, their children are 
pledged for labour – including sex work. 
Female siblings/relatives/
friends/neighbours
Usually those who are already working in the sex industry. Facilitate 
trafficking of, or directly lure, victims into CSE – sometimes by 
deception, sometimes with the victim’s knowledge.
Others 
– carpet, 
portering, 
restaurant
Recruiter/thekedar Offers advances/loans to the family, putting them into debt bondage that 
compels the child to work (e.g. carpet industry).
Parents A child is entrapped in bonded labour (e.g. carpet factories) by inheriting 
his parents’ or other family members’ debt, or by being individually 
pledged.
Relatives/friends Commonly mediate between a child looking for a job and the employer. 
Many of these relatives/friends are already working in the city/in the 
same sector. 
Myanmar CDW Broker Lay person who links the family to a potential employer in the city. Often 
gives parents a three-month advance of the child’s salary – from which 
their commission is drawn – as a ‘guarantee’, to prevent the child from 
quitting or running away. Some brokers are reported to supply children 
to traffickers and forced labour agents. 
Teachers/religious figures 
(monks)/institutes
• Teachers/monks sometimes act as brokers. They are in charge of 
children entrusted by parents for protection and education in monastic 
schools. Monks are approached by employers in search of ‘good 
children’ to work as CDWs. 
• Some Christian orphanages/institutions are said to act as a 
recruitment point for CDWs, but further research is warranted. 
Family/friends/peers • Family/friends facilitate jobs as CDWs for some children, usually 
in cases where the child’s family and employer belong to the same 
village/home town. 
• Friends/peers link a child (who is searching for a job) to a broker.
Child 
trafficking
Trafficker/broker Works in small, family-based groups that operate along with Burmese 
and foreign criminals at destination sites. Some are fraudulent 
recruitment agencies and criminal gangs. Others pose as brokers, 
offering jobs to young women and girls. Many of these brokers are 
relatives and friends of the victims. 
* In some studies, dalals and sub-agents are not interchangeable. Dalals refer to village-level brokers and sub-agents represent the next tier of 
recruitment that connects dalals to PRAs in the city.
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train. One of the channels used by these brokers was a 
messaging service (e.g. Viber) to advertise candidates’ 
photos to potential employers or customers who may 
include traffickers and forced labour agents (ILO 2019d). 
3.2.4 CSE of children in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Myanmar
CSE covering all three countries is elaborated on in 
this sub-section. There is intersectionality and potential 
overlap between CSE and other job sectors or types 
of WFCL. For instance, children who work as CDWs or 
street vendors or those who migrate to the city searching 
for jobs could easily get trapped in CSE or trafficked 
into sex work (ILO 2018). Similarly, elements of sexual 
exploitation can coexist with other types of WFCL. 
In the context of child labour, CSE is often not a 
standalone entity; rather, it intersects with the various 
types of WFCL. Children can be primarily recruited for 
sexual exploitation purposes (e.g. child prostitution) or 
become trapped in CSE following their engagement in 
other work sectors (ECPAT 2014). In the latter situation, 
the initial job could have put the child at a greater 
vulnerability to sexual exploitation (e.g. child workers in 
bars or dance parlours), or the same intermediary could 
be involved in multiple criminal activities (ILO 2019d; 
GMACL 2014). For instance, half of CSE victims in 
Bangladesh reported being involved in different types of 
child labour prior to sexual exploitation (ECPAT 2011). 
CDWs and children working on the streets (e.g. street-
begging) are at a particularly high risk of CSE (ECPAT 
2014). In South Asia, CSE is a common outcome of 
child-trafficking and child marriage (ibid.). Similarly, in 
Myanmar, CSE is often a consequence of child-trafficking 
which can happen to children seeking jobs for the first 
time, or to those already working in teashops, agricultural 
plantations, the fishing industry, and home industries 
(UN-ACT 2014).
In Bangladesh, the ring of CSE is complex and often 
involves multiple layers of intermediaries. Traffickers have 
established circuits for trafficking girls along with village 
heads and law enforcement officials (GMACL 2014). 
Interviews conducted with CSE victims revealed that 
some of the traffickers were individuals close and known 
to them including siblings, parents, and brothers-in-law. 
Female siblings who were involved in prostitution were 
reported to have fetched their younger siblings and sold 
them to brothels. Similarly, mothers were said to have 
sent their daughters (with pimps) to work in brothels, 
and brothers-in-law to have sold victims in exchange for 
money (ibid.). Research showed that many individuals 
took part in the exploitation of victims by facilitating 
CSE in order to make a profit. These were – other than 
traffickers and brothel owners (sometimes called ‘madam’ 
or ‘pimp’) – moneylenders, law enforcement officials, 
lawyers, and the judiciary. 
Traffickers employed a number of tactics to lure victims. 
Some deceived young girls by promising them jobs as 
domestic workers in the Gulf countries but sold them 
off instead to the sex-trade industry (Human Rights 
Watch 2016). Some of the victims worked as domestic 
workers first, before being forced into prostitution. It 
was suggested that there are strong links between the 
mechanism of trafficking for CDW and CSE, and that 
the trafficking rings of both could be linked to the same 
groups or individuals (GMACL 2014).
Cross-border movements of minors for various labour-
related purposes, including CSE, from Bangladesh to 
India were mediated by a number of actors: villagers, 
Indian Border Security Force (BSF) officials, and customs 
officials. Some villagers were also complicit by offering 
shelter to migrants and traffickers/recruiters in exchange 
for money. Shelter was needed for the traffickers to wait 
until night – when border-crossing often took place – and 
to hide the victims until transactions were completed. BSF 
officials were reported to receive bribes through money 
and sexual services (Banerjee 2010). 
In Nepal, CSE is a complex phenomenon that often 
begins with the child entering risky work sectors, like the 
AES. Most young people reported having joined the AES 
voluntarily (Dank et al. 2019). Even though trafficking by 
criminal groups exists, research suggests that their role 
in CSE is smaller compared to the more common route; 
namely, informal job mediation through family members, 
friends, and neighbours. Young women and girls who 
initially seek jobs are ‘assisted’ by individuals they know 
to enter different AES venues as workers. Some were 
aware from the beginning of the nature of working in 
the AES while others were misinformed. The high-risk 
environment in the AES where sexual harassment and 
poor treatment of girls are normalised eventually leads to 
CSE. More details on social norms, labour intermediaries, 
and trajectories of minors in the AES and CSE in Nepal 
are available in Oosterhoff and Hacker (2020).
In cases of trafficking minors, which can be for various 
purposes including CSE, most perpetrators were found 
to be Nepalese nationals – both men and women. 
Traffickers worked in small groups, often in collaboration 
with community members, employers (e.g. brothel 
owners), local officials, border officials, and those who 
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operated ‘safe houses’ (where trafficked persons are kept 
before sale). Evidence showed that traffickers could be 
either ‘freelancers’ who sold victims to brothel owners in a 
specific location, or a person (usually a woman) mobilised 
by brothel owners to ‘recruit labour’ (Tdh 2005). There 
was little evidence linking Nepalese traffickers to Indian 
criminal networks, so trafficking in Nepal was said to be 
an independent system (ibid.). 
A study among Nepalese girls and women brought to 
India for CSE revealed that 25 per cent of victims were 
recruited directly or indirectly by someone they knew in 
the village or workplace. Some CSE victims reported 
having either an aunt, cousin, friend, neighbour, or 
relative already working in an Indian brothel. Victims 
were deceived by promises of jobs, higher wages, better 
working conditions, or marriage, or they followed a ‘man’ 
out of love. Meanwhile, a smaller number reported being 
trafficked from carpet factories in Kathmandu by other 
girls or women they knew (Tdh 2005; Koirala, Banskota 
and Khadka 2004). In other instances, trafficking was 
facilitated by parents and husbands who sold their 
daughters and wives (Deane 2010). 
Following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, there were 
reports of traffickers posing as aid workers or labour 
recruiters. They would offer jobs, education, loans (for 
labour migration), food, and other essentials, or even 
marriage to lure innocent children and youths. Victims 
were eventually trafficked to Kathmandu, India, or Gulf 
countries and forced to engage in CSE or to work in the 
AES (in cabin restaurants and dance bars) (Dharel et al. 
2015; Free the Slaves 2015). Similarly, the practice of 
pledging children among the freed Kamaiya contributed 
to CSE. Pledging happened when parents/families were 
indebted to their employers or recruiters, forcing them to 
give away their children for labour, which included sex 
work (CWA 2007). 
In Myanmar, recruited children are primarily from poor 
socioeconomic backgrounds and marginalised ethnic 
minorities. Young women and girls became victims after 
being deceived by promises of better job opportunities 
and higher wages. Destinations of trafficking included 
foreign countries (e.g. Thailand, China) and within 
Myanmar (UN-ACT 2014). Girls were often forced to 
serve in karaoke lounges or massage parlours before 
getting entrapped in sex work. In other instances, children 
ended up in agricultural plantations, the fishing industry, 
home industries, teashops, small factories, and forced 
begging (van de Glind and Coenjaerts 1998). Victims 
trafficked to China were often sold into marriage or forced 
surrogacy, with most cases mediated by brokers who 
were either the victims’ relatives or friends (UN Women 
2019). Other traffickers consisted of small, family-based 
groups that operate along with Burmese and foreign 
criminals at destination sites (UN-ACT 2014). Trafficking 
activities usually involved a number of actors like trip 
managers, sub-agents, police, guards, and job placement 
agencies, each having a specific role and profit in the 
process (van de Glind and Coenjaerts 1998).
Table 1 describes the different types of entities/individuals 
who act as labour intermediaries and how they work.
3.3 Outcomes of ILI-mediated labour 
and migration
ILIs who engage in abusive and fraudulent recruitment 
practices have proved to cause adverse immediate 
and long-term outcomes. A common example of the 
most immediate outcome is that the aspiring worker is 
charged with excessive recruitment fees, compelling 
the person to take loans either by borrowing money 
from different sources or selling possessions (e.g. land, 
house, cattle, paddy fields, gold, etc.). Often, loans 
are taken from informal sources such as ‘loan sharks’ 
that come with extremely high interest rates. Delay or 
inability to repay debts can easily plunge the worker into 
further exploitation such as forced labour, poor working 
conditions, deduction of wages, debt bondage, etc. – all 
of which may eventually lead to trafficking in persons 
(UNODC 2015). However, it is worth highlighting that 
moneylenders can come in various forms, and that 
some play an important role in assisting those in need 
and driving the informal economy. Elaboration on the 
nature, scale, and impact of informal moneylending can 
be found in Idris (2020). Exploitative working conditions 
– rife with threats, violence, and different forms of 
abuse – are usually a result of deception about the 
nature of employment and wages (Lieten et al. 2010; 
BBS 2011). Those who migrated or were trafficked to 
foreign countries often had their documents forged or 
confiscated, turning them into irregular migrants. This 
status made them vulnerable to arrests and extortion, and 
deprived them of access to social services. In addition, 
involvement of ILIs made it difficult for workers to lodge 
complaints because employers tend to relinquish their 
responsibility (ILO 2019c). 
Across all job sectors within WFCL, experiences of 
deception and abuse as described above are common. 
However, it is important to highlight that to some extent, 
outcomes of ILI-mediated labour are influenced by the 
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Table 2: Outcomes of ILI-mediated labour
Job sector Outcomes/consequences
GENERAL/
CROSS‑CUTTING
Common outcomes across all sectors:
1 Deception by ILIs about wages and the nature of job. 
2 Exploitation and abuse – physical, psychological, and/or sexual.
3 Poor and hazardous working and living conditions.
4 Excessive recruitment fees, leading to debt or debt bondage.
5 Forging and confiscation of identity documents.
6 Trafficking in persons.
SPECIFIC:
CDW
1 Families giving away their child as a domestic worker to repay debts/loans.
2 Families giving away their child through deception about comfortable working 
conditions, access to formal education, arrangement for marriage, etc.
3 Children given away to households as domestic workers without parents’ knowledge.
4 Exploitation and abuse – physical, psychological (isolation, verbal abuse, etc.), and/or 
sexual.
5 Poor working conditions, deprivation of basic needs.
6 Debt and debt bondage.
7 Child unable to quit due to advance or ‘guarantee’ money offered to, and accepted by, 
parents.
8 Trafficking in persons, which leads to CSE or forced labour in other sectors.
Seafood industry 1 Children pressured or forced to engage in work to repay loans/advances taken by 
parents.
2 Deception about wages and the nature of the job.
3 Hazardous working conditions.
Garment industry 1 Deception about wages and the nature of the job.
2 Exploitation and abuse, e.g. long working hours, low salary.
3 Hazardous working conditions.
4 Inability to complain about or demand for rights as informal recruitment enables 
employers to deny responsibility.
Brick kilns 1 Debt bondage and bonded labour – the whole family including children are forced to 
work to repay loans.
2 Hazardous working conditions.
3 Unable to attend/continue school.
CSE* 1 Debt bondage and bonded labour.
2 Abuse and violence – physical, psychological, and/or sexual
3 Extremely hazardous working and living conditions.
4 Exposure to drug abuse, mental health problems, sexually transmitted diseases.
5 Unable to return, kept isolated, and movement controlled.
6 Families receive threats.
Others 1 Abuse and exploitation.
2 Deception about wages and the nature of the job.
3 Hazardous working conditions.
4 Trafficking in persons.
*CSE is often an outcome of child trafficking. It can also overlap with other job sectors. 
Note: Not all ILI-mediated labour outcomes are negative. Positive outcomes have been documented to a smaller extent. These 
include: regular income, contribution to family’s earning, access to formal education (through employers), forging a trusted 
relationship with employers, a more comfortable living and working environment (for CDWs), and successful migration.
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relationship between ILIs and the child, and their motives. 
A closer relationship can act as a ‘buffer’ or ‘protective 
mechanism’ against exploitation and abuse, or at least 
dampen its effects, while a more formal relationship 
(e.g. a stranger, or a distant friend) renders the child more 
prone to adverse consequences. Likewise, the motives of 
ILIs may influence the outcome. The intermediaries whose 
main interest is profit gain are more likely to deceive and 
push the child into exploitative working conditions, while 
those who mediate jobs out of ‘good intention’ – perhaps 
as a sense of familial duty – to either forge relationships 
with other households or maintain a good reputation in 
society, tend to take greater responsibility in ensuring 
the child’s wellbeing (Heissler 2013). As the relationship 
between the worker and broker becomes less personal, 
the moral consequences of breaking verbal contracts 
are less severe (Wise 2013). Nevertheless, this does not 
always mean that recruitment by trusted individuals is 
without negative outcomes. In fact, many documented 
accounts show that deception occurs even when work 
is facilitated by close family members or those in a 
relationship of trust (United Nations 2017). 
For CDWs, exploitation can begin during the recruitment 
process, or later in the workplace. At the recruitment 
phase, some ILIs are said to deceive the child’s family 
by promising either good wages, comfortable working 
conditions, access to formal education, or a dowry for 
marriage. Sometimes, ILIs offer cash or loans to the 
desperate family and demand the child’s service until 
the loans are repaid. Also, there have been accounts of 
families feeling obliged to send away their daughters as 
CDWs when approached by ILIs or employers who had 
extended help to them in the past. In these two situations, 
the child’s pleas can be easily dismissed despite the 
abuses endured. In other instances, children were 
given away as CDWs without the parents’ knowledge. 
This happened when poor families – often in times of 
political crises – entrusted their children to strangers 
(e.g. Buddhist monks in Myanmar) to act in the child’s 
best interest (ILO 2019d).
In the workplace, common outcomes include different 
forms of maltreatment and abuse (BSAF 2016). CDWs 
often reported being forced to work long hours with little 
rest or days off and not being given a proper sleeping 
area or enough food. Studies also claimed that many 
were denied formal or non-formal education, despite 
the promises given earlier by ILIs or employers to the 
parents (Lieten et al. 2010; ILO 2019d; Tamang and 
Frederick 2006). Parents of CDWs were often left 
without hearing from the child – sometimes having to 
depend on ILIs for news – thus living in constant worry 
and anxiety (Hoque 1995). Conflicts have also been 
reported between spouses or among family members 
due to the different reactions to the offer of a job and 
the decision to send away the child as a CDW (Lieten 
et al. 2010). Nevertheless, positive outcomes have also 
been documented. These include a more continuous 
and steady source of income for the family, forging 
a trusted relationship with the employer which was 
deemed important especially in times of difficulty, CDWs 
perceiving their new life and working environment as 
safer and more comfortable than conditions back home, 
and access to formal education (Baumann and Dharel 
2014; Blagbrough 2007).
With regard to CSE, young girls are often lured by ILIs 
promising them decent work in the city or a foreign 
country (e.g. as domestic or factory workers). The high 
recruitment fees forced them to borrow money or give 
up some possessions, putting them in debt. Many of 
these girls end up being trafficked into the sex industry or 
sold off as brides. Where inadequate payment is made, 
children would be indebted to the trafficker or employer 
(who claimed to have covered their expenses related to 
travelling, etc.), and thus had to work for a specific period 
of time until the debt was repaid. Many trafficked children 
become bonded labourers living in extremely hazardous 
conditions which can even be life-threatening (van de 
Glind and Coenjaerts 1998). Long-term consequences 
of such exploitation are mental health problems like 
depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), sexually transmitted diseases, and attempted 
suicide (Rimal and Papadopoulos 2016; Kiss et al. 
2015). Many girls who are initially forced into prostitution 
continue working as commercial sex workers or later as 
pimps, as they are left with little option and reintegration is 
extremely difficult (Jha and Madison 2011; Biraj 2012).
In the garment sector, informal recruitment has been 
shown to hinder workers’ efforts to demand higher wages 
and decent working conditions, as outsourced contractual 
relationships to a third party enable employers to evade 
accountability (ILO 2019c).
Table 2 provides a list of ILI-mediated labour outcomes.
3.4 Interventions targeting labour 
intermediaries 
Interventions that target labour intermediaries and 
recruitment processes can be broadly categorised into 
two types: legal and socioeconomic. Legal interventions 
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include international conventions and standards, codes 
of conduct, national policies and laws, and advocacy 
work. Socioeconomic interventions are initiatives 
and programmes designed and implemented by the 
government, private sector, and NGOs (e.g. social 
labelling, training of recruitment practitioners, cash 
transfer, etc.) to promote fair recruitment and eliminate 
exploitative and fraudulent practices. 
International instruments
A number of international instruments have been laid 
down to promote higher labour standards, protect workers 
from abuse and exploitation and combat human trafficking 
and child labour. Examples are the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998; 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); and the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). 
These core conventions, along with the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have been widely 
ratified. Some instruments which are more focused on 
recruitment practices – such as the Private Employment 
Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181); Domestic Workers 
Convention, 2011 (No. 189); and the ILO Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration – have not been adopted 
by many countries, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Myanmar. Other instruments are related to disclosure, 
transparency, and due diligence such as the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, the ILO Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the ‘MNE 
Declaration’), and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (ILO 2019b).
National policies and laws
In Bangladesh, two key policies to combat child labour 
– the National Child Labour Elimination Policy, 2010 and 
Child Labour National Plan of Action (2012–2016) – do 
not target labour intermediaries directly. Rather, they 
attempt to reduce the risks of fraudulent recruitment 
practices by pressuring employers to comply to a set 
of standards and raising public awareness. These 
policies, however, along with the National Plan of Action 
for Combating Human Trafficking (2015–2017), directly 
target traffickers, or other perpetrators complicit in 
trafficking. Similarly, the Domestic Workers and Welfare 
Protection Policy, 2010 does not explicitly address 
employment agencies or labour recruiters, but focuses 
on working conditions, salary, minimum working age, 
and other aspects (IDWFED 2015). National legislation 
that aims to regulate recruitment businesses and 
operations includes the Overseas Employment and 
Migrants Act, 2013 and associated Rules; Rules for 
Conduct and Licensing Recruitment Agencies (2002); 
Rules for Wage Earners’ Welfare Fund (2002); and the 
Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act, 
2012 (IOM 2015; Imam and Munier 2020). These laws 
are more often referred to in the context of international 
migration. Currently, there are no clear rules or policies 
on Bangladeshis who act as ILIs abroad and the 
existing regulatory framework does not hold labour 
recruiters responsible for the conduct of illegal brokers or 
intermediaries who act on their behalf (Barkat, Hossain 
and Hoque 2014).
In Nepal, there are three key policies designed to 
combat child labour: the National Master Plan to End 
Child Labour, the School Sector Development Plan, and 
the National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The 
latter directly targets perpetrators of human trafficking. 
National legislation includes the Human Trafficking and 
Transportation (Control) Act, 2007; Human Trafficking 
Control Act, 1986; and the Child Labor (Prohibition and 
Regulation) Act, 2000 (Baumann and Dharel 2014; Deane 
2010). Laws aiming to regulate the recruitment industry 
are the Foreign Employment Act, 2007 (No. 18) and 
Foreign Employment Rules, 2008 (Baumann and Dharel 
2014; USDOL 2018). Among the efforts by the Nepalese 
government deemed effective in controlling labour 
intermediaries was the incorporation of joint liability into 
bilateral agreements with other countries (ILO 2019b).
The government of Myanmar has established a number 
of key policies to tackle child labour and promote decent 
work. Examples are the Joint Action Plan with the UN 
to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of Children for 
Military Purposes, the Myanmar Child Labour Eradication 
Project, the National Plan of Action to Combat Human 
Trafficking, the Myanmar Sustainable Development 
Plan (2018–2030), and the Myanmar Decent Work 
Country Programme (2018–2021). Existing national 
laws include the Child Labour Act, the Human Trafficking 
and Transportation Control Act, and the Children’s Act 
(USDOL 2018).
Transparency legislation and due diligence laws
A number of countries have adopted transparency 
legislation and due diligence laws, targeting human 
trafficking, child labour, and forced labour in the supply 
chain of large retailers and manufacturers. Examples of 
transparency legislation are the Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act (2010) in California, the Modern Slavery Act 
(2015) in the UK, and the Modern Slavery Act (2019) in 
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Australia. Meanwhile, examples of due diligence laws 
include the Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law (2017) in 
France and the Child Labour Due Diligence Law (2019) in 
the Netherlands (ILO 2019b). While the nature and scope 
of these laws may vary and not necessarily target labour 
intermediaries, employment agencies and recruitment 
practices can be among the components assessed 
(Burberry 2018). However, little is known about the 
outcomes and effectiveness of supply chain transparency 
and due diligence as they are relatively new and have not 
been fully evaluated (ILO 2019b). 
Programmes and initiatives by international 
organisations, governments, and the private sector
Some programmes that have been carried out by the 
government, private sector, NGOs, and international 
organisations to promote ethical recruitment and combat 
fraudulent practices in the recruitment industry are 
outlined in this section.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) 
project2 is a global initiative that promotes ethical 
international recruitment through: (a) defining and setting 
a benchmark for ethical recruitment (the IRIS standard); 
(b) establishing a voluntary certification scheme for 
ethical labour recruiters; and (c) compliance and 
monitoring mechanism. Multiple stakeholders are involved 
such as governments, the private sector (employers, 
suppliers, brands, etc.), and civil society organisations. 
Activities supported by IRIS include awareness-raising, 
advocacy and capacity building, recruitment regulation, 
and monitoring international recruitment practices 
(ILO 2019b).
IRIS was launched in Nepal at the end of 2018. The 
training of labour recruiters was carried out in Nepal 
and Myanmar to increase their understanding of ethical 
recruitment practices. However, no published evidence on 
the outcome of IRIS in these countries was found. 
The ILO–DFID Work in Freedom programme aims to 
promote empowerment, fair recruitment, safe migration, 
and decent work for South Asian women and girls, with 
the final goal of preventing human trafficking. It focuses 
on domestic work and the garment sector in five countries 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Jordan, and Lebanon) and 
involves multiple stakeholders including governments, 
trade unions, businesses, employers, recruitment 
agencies, NGOs, and migrant workers. Work in Freedom 
2 See https://iris.iom.int/.
targets the recruitment industry through promoting ‘ethical 
practices by raising awareness of the provisions of the 
ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 
181) and industry good practice, and by promoting the 
implementation of codes of practice based on full respect 
for workers’ rights’ (ILO 2015: 3). The programme also 
works to enhance the monitoring and regulation of the 
recruitment industry through capacity building. To date, 
approximately 600 labour recruiters have been identified 
and included in the pilot study where training on ethical 
recruitment practices was given (ILO 2013). 
The ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative is a 
multi-stakeholder programme that places social dialogue 
at its centre and focuses on four aspects: (a) enhancing 
global knowledge on national and international 
recruitment practices; (b) improving laws, policies, and 
enforcement mechanisms to promote fair recruitment 
practices; (c) promoting fair business practices; and 
(d) empowering and protecting workers (ILO 2019b).
Under this initiative, a pilot project was conducted among 
Nepalese female workers who migrated to Jordan to work 
in the garment sector. Workers were made to undergo a 
fair recruitment process, in which they paid no (or very 
minimal) recruitment fees, were properly educated on 
their contract terms, and were provided with transparent 
information on their working conditions and salary at 
an earlier stage. When compared to conventionally 
recruited workers, fair recruitment had the following 
impacts: (a) a better relationship between workers and 
the supervisor; (b) positive traits among workers (such 
as feeling proud of their work, being emotionally stable, 
etc.); (c) higher levels of trust; (d) greater confidence 
to lodge complaints against mistreatment; and (e) less 
absenteeism and higher productivity. Overall, fair 
recruitment was found to have improved the working 
environment, work performance, and workers’ wellbeing. 
It also led to less migration-related debts (ILO 2019a). 
The Better Brick Nepal (BBN) project was jointly 
implemented by the Brick Clean Group Nepal (BCN), Global 
Fairness Initiative (GFI), and GoodWeave International 
(GWI) from August 2013 in Nepal (GoodWeave 2015). 
The two broad objectives of BBN were to reduce forced, 
bonded, and child labour on brick kilns and facilitate the 
development of a market-based model to certify bricks. The 
intermediaries, known as labour contractors, were targeted 
in this project in the following ways (ibid.): 
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a Recruitment of children younger than 14 years old 
was prohibited. If underage recruitment occurred, the 
employer had to intervene and reunite the child with 
his or her family with the cost borne by the employer 
and labour contractor. Any advance loans given to the 
family could not be taken back.
b Employers had to educate and generate awareness 
among labour contractors on the prohibition and 
restrictions in employment of children and young 
workers through meetings, training sessions, etc.
c Employers had to require the labour contractor to 
verify the age of all workers who appeared to be on the 
borderline of 14, 16, and 18 years.
d Debts incurred through advance payments or loans 
(given by labour contractors or kiln owners) could not 
be used to bond or force workers into employment.
e Labour contractors and employers were not allowed to 
withhold any original documents of workers.
f Where payment (salary) was made by contractors, it 
had to be overseen by relevant kiln representatives. 
g Labour contractors must register themselves and 
obtain permission from the regional administrative 
office in order to recruit workers.
It is unclear to what extent the impact of BBN is, or what 
the outcomes are. But the limited available evidence 
indicates that the initiative has resulted in a safer working 
environment, higher satisfaction among workers, greater 
worker retention, and access to education for the workers’ 
children (Shrestha and Thygerson 2019).
The ILO Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) 
operates in Nepal and Myanmar. The DWCP in Nepal 
aims to promote decent work and provide a framework 
to determine priority areas of cooperation in accordance 
with the ILO’s mandate and strategic objectives. The 
three priority areas are promotion of employment-
centric and inclusive growth, improved labour market 
governance and industrial relations, and promotion of 
fundamental principles and rights at work (ILO 2013). 
To improve recruitment services, ILO has worked 
with the government and private sector – such as 
Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies 
(NAFEA) – and improved the monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms as a way of protecting migrant workers 
during employment. Support services in destination 
countries have also been built (de Groot 2010). Currently, 
audit tools are being developed so that recruitment 
agencies can engage in independent audit exercises 
(ILO 2018a). 
The DWCP in Myanmar has promoted and facilitated 
registration of recruitment agencies and encouraged them 
to adopt a Code of Conduct (ILO 2018b). The outcomes 
of these interventions, however, have not been clearly 
studied as the programme is ongoing.
The Code of Conduct for the Members of Myanmar 
Overseas Employment Agencies Federation (MOEAF) 
was developed by the MOEAF and Ministry of Labour, 
Immigration and Population (MOLIP), with technical 
input from the ILO TRIANGLE in ASEAN project, with 
the goal of promoting fair recruitment practices. These 
mainly included transparency on migration costs and 
accountability for the return and reintegration of migrant 
workers. Through this initiative, technical training was 
provided to PRAs on their obligations to abide by certain 
ethical standards. As a result, to date, approximately 
183 PRAs have signed the Code of Conduct and agreed 
to be monitored by the authority (ILO 2018c).
The United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human 
Trafficking (UNIAP) was an anti-trafficking project in 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) that ran from 
2000 to 2013 in three phases. One of the six initiatives 
under Phase III was the Strategic Information Response 
Network (SIREN) that aims at delivering high-quality 
and up-to-date data on emerging issues within the 
human trafficking sector (UNIAP 2013). Under SIREN, 
a public–private sector consultation was carried out to 
discuss exploitative brokering and human trafficking in 
the shrimp supply chains in Thailand. As a result, ‘US 
suppliers made some purchase policy changes, including 
consolidating and auditing regional suppliers, and getting 
their processors to source exclusively from them’. Another 
outcome was a private sector-driven programme by US 
suppliers and their partners to address trafficking in Thai 
export supply chains (ibid.). One of the other Phase III 
initiatives was the Worst Offenders Project, in which 
UNIAP – along with police and selected NGOs – tracked 
human trafficking offenders, exploiters, employers, and 
brokers in GMS to assist investigation, prosecution, and 
compensation for victims. Training was also conducted 
with recruitment agencies in Myanmar to raise awareness 
on human trafficking (ibid.).
There have been initiatives by business companies 
to improve recruitment practices. As part of their 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies, some 
companies have taken steps to adopt supply chain 
transparency and combat abuses that occur along this 
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Table 3: Programmes/initiatives that target labour intermediaries in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Myanmar
Intervention/
programme
Brief description Targeted 
intermediary
Outcome(s)
International 
Recruitment Integrity 
System (IRIS) project 
by IOM
A global initiative that promotes ethical 
international recruitment through setting 
a benchmark for ethical recruitment, 
establishing a voluntary certification 
scheme for ethical labour recruiters, and 
a compliance and monitoring mechanism. 
Training of labour recruiters was carried out 
in Myanmar and Nepal.
Mainly private 
recruitment/
employment 
agencies (PRAs)
Not found/not 
available yet
Work in Freedom by 
ILO-DFID
A programme that promotes empowerment, 
fair recruitment, safe migration, and decent 
work for South Asian women and girls, with 
a focus on domestic work and the garment 
sector in five countries: Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, Jordan, and Lebanon. To date, 600 
labour recruiters have been trained on 
ethical recruitment. 
Mainly PRAs Not found/not 
available yet
Fair Recruitment 
Initiative by ILO
A multi-stakeholder programme that places 
social dialogue at its centre and aims at 
promoting fair and ethical recruitment, and 
empowering workers. Under this initiative, 
a pilot project was conducted among 
Nepalese female workers who migrated to 
Jordan to work in the garment sector.
PRA Less absenteeism, 
higher productivity, 
and improved 
working 
environment and 
workers’ wellbeing. 
Less migration-
related debts.
Better Brick Nepal 
(BBN) 
A project by the Brick Clean Group Nepal 
(BCN), Global Fairness Initiative (GFI), and 
GoodWeave International (GWI). Objectives 
were to reduce forced, bonded, and child 
labour on brick kilns and facilitate the 
development of a market-based model to 
certify bricks.
Labour contractors Safer working 
environment, higher 
satisfaction among 
workers, greater 
worker retention, 
and access to 
education for the 
workers’ children
Decent Work 
Country Programme 
(DWCP) in Nepal and 
Myanmar by ILO
A project to promote decent work and 
improve recruitment services through 
collaboration with the government and private 
sector. Other than developing audit tools, 
DWCP promotes and facilitates registration of 
recruitment agencies and encourages them 
to adopt a Code of Conduct. 
Mainly PRAs
Code of Conduct 
for the Members of 
Myanmar Overseas 
Employment 
Agencies Federation 
(MOEAF)
A Code of Conduct to promote fair recruitment 
practices, focusing on transparency of 
migration costs and accountability for the 
return and reintegration of migrant workers. 
To date, 183 PRAs have signed the Code of 
Conduct and agreed to be monitored.
PRAs Not published/not 
available yet 
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chain, particularly unethical recruitment (UNODC 2015). 
For instance, Arcadia Group, a British multinational 
retailing company, developed recruitment guidelines for 
all its suppliers, conducted training to promote ethical 
recruitment, and provided Migrant Worker Guidelines that 
specifically prohibit recruitment fees, mandatory deposits, 
and retention of identity documents (Arcadia n.d.). 
Bangladesh is among Arcadia’s suppliers. Little is known 
about the outcomes of these efforts. 
Various local NGOs in Nepal have carried out 
interventions to fight forced labour, CSE, and child labour 
with the help of government institutions and international 
organisations. Activities that targeted labour recruiters 
were mainly in: (a) the legal field, through advocacy work, 
capacity building, and provision of legal aid to victims in 
order to facilitate prosecution of traffickers and fraudulent 
recruiters; (b) businesses, through promoting codes of 
conduct; and (c) the criminal justice response, through 
conducting raids with law enforcers (Baumann and Dharel 
2014). However, evidence on the outcomes of these 
interventions was not reported. 
Some indirect interventions may have affected 
recruiters. For instance, initiatives or programmes that did 
not target labour intermediaries led to the establishment 
of a child protection committee or vigilance groups at the 
village and district level (Dharel et al. 2015); negotiation 
with employers to ensure transparency and better 
working conditions (Save the Children 2014); capacity 
building of law enforcers and relevant organisations 
(Banerjee 2010); and awareness-raising activities such 
as campaigns, cultural programmes, and meetings with 
community members including parents, employers, 
teachers, and religious leaders (Save the Children 2014; 
WVI 2017; Sjoblom and Chowdhury 2014). Generating 
public awareness is especially important given that 
ILIs are often living in the same community and known 
to victims. 
There were also interventions in the form of providing a 
hotline for trafficking victims (e.g. the UNIAP Myanmar-
language hotline in Thailand) and training to raise 
awareness about online safety among children, parents, 
and relevant stakeholders. The former was reported 
to have shown mixed results: while less than one-third 
of lodged complaints led to action by law enforcers in 
Thailand, a number of victims were identified and given 
support, and some offenders were arrested (UNIAP 
2013). The latter, on the other hand, specifically targeted 
the emerging trend of online grooming through social 
media platforms by traffickers who duped children into 
CSE through promises of work (The Freedom Fund 
2019). Complaint mechanisms have also been officially 
Table 3: Programmes/initiatives that target labour intermediaries in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Myanmar (cont.)
Intervention/
programme
Brief description Targeted 
intermediary
Outcome(s)
The United Nations 
Inter-Agency Project 
on Human Trafficking 
(UNIAP) Phase III 
Anti-trafficking project in the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region (GMS). Under its SIREN initiative, 
a public–private sector consultation was 
carried out to address exploitative brokering 
and human trafficking in the shrimp supply 
chains in Thailand. Under its Worst Offenders 
Project, traffickers, exploiters, employers, and 
brokers in GMS were tracked. 
Traffickers, brokers Purchase policy 
changes made 
by US suppliers 
as a response to 
consultation on Thai 
shrimp industry
Supply chain 
transparency 
initiatives by 
business companies 
As part of CSR, some companies have 
adopted supply chain transparency to 
combat abuses that occur along this 
chain, particularly unethical recruitment. 
For example, Arcadia Group provided 
recruitment guidelines to all its suppliers.
Whole supply chain No published 
evidence on 
outcome yet 
*The programmes listed in this table are not comprehensive. Some initiatives were not included for reasons such as labour 
intermediaries not being directly targeted and initiatives not being relevant to Nepal/Bangladesh/Myanmar. Evidence of the outcomes 
of listed programmes may not be fully available yet, as some programmes are relatively new or ongoing.
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established in Bangladesh (2013) and Nepal (2010) to 
enable workers to lodge reports of fraud, deception, 
or exploitation committed by employers or recruiters 
(IOM 2015). 
Another intervention which impacted labour 
intermediaries indirectly was provision of microcredit 
to families at risk. Evidence showed that access to 
microcredit was a protective factor against trafficking and 
child labour, as it reduced families’ dependency on loans 
offered by middlemen (who could act as both recruiters 
and moneylenders) (World Education 2009). However, 
this is beyond the scope of this review. 
Table 3 summarises the programmes/initiatives that target 
labour intermediaries.
SUMMARY
Addressing Informal Labour Intermediaries in the 
Context of Child Labour: Evidence Review across 
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar
Section 4:
DISCUSSION
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4 DISCUSSION
While stories of fraudulent and exploitative recruitment 
and its consequences are not new to rural communities, 
the presence of ILIs remains palpable with no sign 
of decline. This is a possible indication that society 
– regardless of socioeconomic status – continues to 
seek their assistance or at least accept their operation 
and activities. Existing literature has largely painted 
a negative impression of ILIs which is without doubt 
corroborated by ample evidence. However, positive 
outcomes of ILI-mediated labour (Abrar et al. 2017) – 
documented to a much lesser extent – could be one 
reason why ILI ‘help’ or services continue to be sought 
after. In a study among a group of Bangladeshi migrant 
workers, a positive perception of informal brokers was 
found; they were seen as helpful, efficient, ‘able to keep 
promises’, and a stepping stone that had enabled the 
workers to economically thrive (ibid.). Likewise, some 
interviewed brokers admitted to trying hard to deliver 
their promises and avoid ‘failures’ in order to maintain a 
good reputation in the community, which is an essential 
element for every broker (ibid.). They also expressed 
joy to see a rural family grow out of poverty as a result 
of their help (MFA 2019a, 2019b). Another study among 
CDWs across seven countries – many of whom entered 
the sector through family members, relatives, neighbours, 
etc. – showed mixed outcomes. While some CDWs 
reported maltreatment, others had positive experiences 
such as having regular earnings, establishing a trusted 
relationship with the employer, getting access to 
formal education, and enjoying more comfortable living 
conditions (Blagbrough 2007). These positive perceptions 
and ‘success stories’ are perhaps the reason why ILIs 
continue to thrive. In other instances, even when workers 
found themselves deceived by ILIs, they still continued 
working as they had to weigh up the risks of poverty at 
home vs the disadvantages of abuse in the workplace. 
Interventions at the legal/policy level – in the forms of 
international instruments and national policies/laws – to 
regulate labour intermediaries are relatively detailed 
and comprehensive. The problem appears to lie in weak 
enforcement and lack of implementation (UNODC 2015). 
Therefore, it is difficult to assess the outcomes of such 
policies and legislation. This review did not find any robust 
evidence on the outcomes of international conventions 
or national policies and legislation with regard to labour 
intermediaries that can be linked to child labour. 
Most programmes targeting labour recruiters included in 
this report have focused on PRAs or their associations. 
These were usually registered entities, or entities with 
clear legal identities with premises located in cities. 
None of the programmes described in Section 3 – with 
the exception of Better Brick Nepal (GFI n.d.) – directly 
involved ILIs. It is unclear how targeting formal PRAs 
can affect informal agents or sub-agents, or other 
intermediaries operating independently in rural settings, 
in a meaningful way. Prior studies had similarly pointed 
out that ‘recruitment regulations commonly only cover 
recruiters operating at the upper end of the labour supply 
chain, leaving the various labour intermediaries and 
subcontractors acting on behalf of the recruiters outside 
the government’s regulatory authority’ (ILO 2019b: 41). 
It has also been argued that the tendency to focus on 
‘ethical recruitment’ among PRAs may not be effective 
in some Asian countries mainly because ‘there is not 
currently a market for ethical recruitment in this region 
on any significant scale’ and employers are not willing to 
pay for the costs of ethical recruitment (IOM 2015: 108). 
In addition, the excessive emphasis on recruiters could 
render employers ‘less noticeable’ when they in fact 
hold greater power and ability to influence recruitment 
business practices (ibid.). For instance, the ‘Promoting 
Decent Work in Brick Kilns’ pilot project in Tamil Nadu, 
India was regarded as among the good practices in 
addressing child and bonded labour. Even though 
recruiters and moneylenders were identified as entry 
points through which poor families became entrapped 
in debt and subsequently labour in brick kilns, the 
successful intervention was largely driven by employers 
(IPEC-ILO 2010). The project described ‘sensitisation of 
both employers and recruiters’ as a necessary condition 
for such an initiative to be effective (ibid.).
Most interventions in the recruitment industry have 
been designed in the context of international migration. 
While this did not exclude children, there was rarely any 
specific mention of, or discussion on, child labourers 
(e.g. young girls who migrated to foreign countries to 
work as domestic help or in garment factories). The link 
between existing programmes (aiming to regulate the 
recruitment industry) and WFCL has not been made 
explicit, thus leaving a huge gap. In addition, none of 
the listed initiatives has targeted the less known – but 
larger – group of individuals who generally do not view 
themselves as labour intermediaries but often act as 
one; namely, parents, siblings, relatives, peers, friends, 
teachers, religious figures, and institutions. Findings in 
this review showed that most labour intermediation that 
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is associated with WFCL was kinship-based, an aspect 
largely overlooked in policy responses. While it might 
sound impossible to regulate these ‘intermediaries’ due 
to the nature of relationships and the extremely informal 
settings in which recruitment occurs, future initiatives 
need to at least take into account these dynamics.
Few interventions reported on their outcomes or impacts. 
This could be attributed to the lack of evaluation capacity 
or their in-progress status. For instance, a number of local 
NGOs in Nepal carried out anti-trafficking programmes 
but did not have the capacity to monitor and evaluate their 
impact or effectiveness. Similarly, despite the growing 
popularity of supply chain transparency (SCT) and due 
diligence among multinational businesses, little evidence 
is available on their outcomes. However, a number 
of companies have attempted to address recruitment 
issues in their SCT effort, with considerable success 
(UNODC 2015; Arcadia n.d.; Apple 2020). One example 
is Apple’s fee reimbursement programme that forced 
Apple’s suppliers to refund recruitment fees charged to 
workers to get them out of debt bondage. As a result, 
suppliers ended contracts with recruitment agencies that 
had illegally charged exorbitant fees (IOM 2015; Apple 
2014). Supply and labour chain transparency thus can 
be considered a promising intervention, deserving further 
attention and research. 
It is interesting to note that among the documented good 
practices addressing WFCL in agricultural sectors across 
seven countries – Brazil, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Tanzania, Thailand, and Nicaragua – 
most designed interventions did not include or target 
recruiters (IPEC-ILO 2014). This was despite the fact that 
deceptive recruitment and trafficking were shown to have 
played a role (Verité 2013). For example, while some 
children entered the jermal fishing industry in Indonesia 
through deceptive recruitment, programmes had focused 
on other actors like employers, labour inspectors, parents, 
NGOs, teachers, and the local community. Similarly, 
even though many workers (including children) were 
trafficked into the Thai fishing industry, interventions had 
mainly targeted employers, with promising outcomes 
(IPEC-ILO 2014; Human Rights Watch 2018). While the 
reason for this ‘omission’ is unclear, it could imply that 
because addressing ILIs is extremely challenging, it is 
more practical to direct the focus and resources to other 
stakeholders. Alternatively, it could mean that not much 
is known about ILIs in these settings, hence the lack of 
initiatives addressing them. Nevertheless, a common 
theme across all these good practices is the importance 
of mixed modalities of interventions. 
One challenge to tackle ILIs in WFCL is to bring about 
more fundamental changes to the values, ways of 
thinking, and societal norms. Evidence showed that 
many ILIs did not perceive their action as erroneous or 
saw themselves as recruiters, despite being aware of the 
possible consequences of the job they were facilitating. 
In fact, they viewed themselves positively – as helpers, 
mediators, and service providers. For example, monks 
in Myanmar were entrusted by parents in remote or 
conflict-ridden areas to provide shelter and protection 
for their children. Some of these children were taken to 
the city or monastic schools, and later given away to 
employers seeking domestic workers. This was often 
done with good faith, said to be in the ‘best interest’ of the 
child (ILO 2019d). Similarly, relatives, friends, or siblings 
facilitating jobs for a child may do so with good intentions, 
even if the child is subsequently exploited or entrapped in 
slavery-like conditions. With a background of poverty and 
illiteracy, the tendency among rural families to excessively 
trust people known to them, or those with influence 
and power, has made it easy for intermediaries to take 
advantage of the situation. 
Given the rapid adoption of technology and social media 
among children and youths even in rural communities, 
recruiters are increasingly using this medium for preying 
on potential victims (ECPAT 2018). There is ample 
evidence of traffickers or criminals using social media for 
online grooming and recruiting of children. Victims could 
be then physically trafficked into different work sectors, 
especially the sex industry, or tricked into online sexual 
exploitation such as child pornography (Mera 2019). More 
research is urgently needed in this field, where recruiters 
can be invisible and recruitment is done virtually. 
Abusive and fraudulent practices by ILIs thrive in 
conditions where corruption is rife and law enforcement 
is weak. Similarly, trafficking activities are facilitated by 
the presence of law enforcers, border security officials, 
community members (villagers, taxi drivers, etc.), and 
even families who readily ‘lend support’ to traffickers 
to gain profit. Such complicity is intricate, often arising 
from an interplay between poverty, ignorance, greed, 
corruption, absence of rule of law, and weak governance. 
Therefore, interventions that target the recruitment 
industry or ILIs alone are unlikely to be effective. Structural 
factors that allow their abusive practices to continue 
need to be equally addressed. Similarly, elements that 
are not directly related to recruitment issues but can act 
as protective mechanisms – such as microfinance and 
access to schools – should be combined with interventions 
targeting labour intermediaries. 
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5 LIMITATIONS
This review has a number of limitations. First, being 
desk-based research, it relied almost entirely on 
published material. Thus, some relevant information was 
simply not available or could not be captured. This might 
be due to data or evidence on programmes/interventions 
not being officially documented or published by the 
organisation running them. For instance, local NGOs 
may not have the capacity to publish, or the incentive to 
systematically document their programmes, so the only 
way to access this information is by physically reaching 
out to them. Second, restriction to studies/reports written 
in English could have excluded a wealth of information 
published or available in other languages like Bengali, 
Nepali, and Burmese. Third, this review did not include 
perspectives of qualitative data from interviews with field 
experts or key informants. Findings need to be viewed in 
the light of these constraints.
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Definition
Labour recruiter The term ‘labour recruiter’ as expressed in the Forced Labour (Supplementary Measures) 
Recommendation, 2014 (No. 203), can refer to both private and public entities that offer 
labour recruitment services. Private entities can take many forms: formal (e.g. registered 
under commercial or other law) or informal (not registered, such as informal sub-agents), 
profit-seeking (e.g. fee charging agencies), or non-profit (e.g. trade union hiring halls). 
Private recruitment 
agencies (PRAs)
Private employment agencies fall within the definition of labour recruiters. In particular, 
they are defined by the ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 
as ‘a natural or legal person, independent of the public authorities, which provides one 
or more of the following labour market services: (a) services for matching offers of and 
applications for employment, without the private employment agency becoming a party to 
the employment relationships that may arise therefrom; (b) services consisting of employing 
workers with a view to making them available to a third party, who may be a natural or legal 
person (referred to below as a ‘user enterprise’) that assigns their tasks and supervises 
the execution of these tasks; (c) other services relating to job-seeking, determined by 
the competent authority after consulting the most representative employers and workers 
organisations, such as the provision of information, that do not set out to match specific 
offers of and applications for employment.’ (Article 1(1)).
Sub-agents Individual agents usually work in loose partnerships with PRAs. They are the first point of 
contact for individuals seeking foreign employment. Sub-agents charge fees (official and 
hidden) for their services, which distinguishes them from other individuals within ‘social 
networks’ that facilitate migration.
Worst forms of child 
labour 
Based on Article 3 of the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), 
WFCL comprises:
a All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of 
children, debt bondage and serfdom, and forced or compulsory labour, including forced 
or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict;
b The use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography 
or for pornographic performances;
c The use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production 
and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties;
d Work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm 
the health, safety or morals of children.
Trafficking The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, which supplements the United Nations Conventions Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2000 (the ‘Trafficking in Persons’ Protocol) defines human trafficking as 
the ‘Recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another for the purpose of 
exploitation’.
Forced labour The ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), defines ‘forced or compulsory labour’ 
as: ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty 
and to which the said person has not offered him voluntarily’ (World Education 2009). ‘Work 
and services’ includes all types of work, employment or occupation, whether legal or not. 
‘Menace of any penalty’ includes all forms of criminal sanctions and other forms of coercion, 
including threats, violence, retention of identity documents, confinement, non-payment or 
illegal deduction of wages, or debt bondage.
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ANNEXE B: LIST AND 
COMBINATIONS OF SEARCH 
TERMS
For the academic literature search, the following terms 
were used in title/abstract/keyword:
(Intervention* OR program* OR measure* OR initiative* 
OR effort* OR action* OR response* OR legislat* OR 
regulat*)
AND
((informal labour intermediaries) OR intermediar* OR 
(employment agenc*) OR contractor* OR subcontractor* 
OR broker* OR middlem* OR trafficker* OR fixer* OR 
recruiter* OR (recruitment agen*) OR smuggler OR 
(labour agen*) OR (quasi-labour agen*)) OR famil* OR 
friend* OR peer* OR kin* or (fictive kin*) OR neighb* OR 
contact* OR (religious figure*) OR monk* OR teacher* OR 
parent* OR community
AND
((child labour) OR (child labor) OR (child exploitation) OR 
(child slavery) OR (child soldier*) OR (child prostitut*) 
OR (child pornography) OR (child trafficking)) OR (sexual 
exploitation) OR (child domestic work*) OR (bonded 
labour) OR Kamaiya
AND
(Nepal OR Myanmar OR Bangladesh) 
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CLARISSA works by co-developing with stakeholders practical 
options for children to avoid engagement in the worst forms of child 
labour in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal. 
The participatory processes which underpin the programme 
are designed to generate innovation from the ground which can 
sustainably improve the lives of children and their families.
The programme’s outputs are similarly co-designed and collaboratively 
produced to enhance local ownership of the knowledge, and to ensure 
that our research uptake and engagement strategy is rooted in the 
direct experience of the people most affected on the ground.
